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An Atlas of Trafficking in Southeast Asia:  
The Illegal Trade in Arms, Drugs, People, Counterfeit Goods, and Natural Resources  
in Mainland Southeast Asia 
 
 
Introduction: Illegal Trades across National Borders 
Pierre-Arnaud CHOUVY 
 
 
 
Mainland Southeast Asia—or Indochina as it has long been known owing to its position 
between India and China (see map 1)—has been marked by decades of trafficking in illegal 
goods. Illegal trades in mainland Southeast Asia are numerous, highly diverse, and most 
likely increasingly complex. Of course, two of the most prominent illegal trades defining the 
area are human trafficking and drug trafficking, human trafficking in relation, notably, to the 
extensive regional prostitution market it feeds, with Thailand being infamous the world over 
for that reason; and drug trafficking in relation to opium and heroin produced in bulk within 
the similarly ill-famed Golden Triangle. Complexity arises from the fact that human 
trafficking and drug trafficking can be said to be linked in some places and to some extent, 
whether drug consumption by prostitutes―and by many of their clients―is concerned or 
whether economic havoc created by excessively brutal and rapid eradication of illegal crops 
pushes women into prostitution. However, as we will see, complexity is likewise increased by 
the fact that many other illegal trades feed off these two major trafficking activities and their 
sometimes congruous networks. Some of these trades may, at some point, contribute to one 
another; they may also proceed, to some extent, from propitious specific regional dynamics 
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(trafficking in drugs and arms in the context of armed conflicts for example). It is this great 
diversity and complexity of illegal trading across mainland Southeast Asia that this book 
addresses, focusing on five of its most pervasive phenomenon: drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, arms trafficking, wildlife and timber trafficking, and the trade in counterfeit 
goods and contraband.  
As might be expected, the peninsular mass of mainland Southeast Asia is not only one of 
Asia‘s historical major crossroads (hence ―Indochina‖ and the French Indochine). It is also 
famous worldwide as the site of the so-called Golden Triangle, one of the two main areas of 
illegal opium production in Asia and one of the largest in the world for that matter. But, 
insofar as illegal activities are concerned, contemporary mainland Southeast Asia is known 
not only as a locus of illegal drug production but also as a drug trafficking hub and a 
significant drug consumer market. Heroin and methamphetamine are produced mainly in 
Burma (also known as Myanmar since 1988) and trafficked heavily throughout the region. 
Heroin and methamphetamine may be consumed regionally (both in mainland and in insular 
Southeast Asia) or may be exported to China (via the province of Yunnan), to India (via its 
northeastern states), or overseas, mostly to Japan, Australia, and North and South America 
(see map 13). 
However, many other trafficking or smuggling activities have long occurred in and 
throughout mainland Southeast Asia while others are now in the process of being developed. 
One of them, constantly increasing both regionally and worldwide, is human trafficking. This 
activity shares many features with drug trafficking and, although statistics are unreliable and 
trustworthy studies remain scant, it is frequently mentioned as becoming the world‘s largest 
illegal economy. Again, though, the assertion is unverifiable since no one can reasonably 
provide a precise estimate of the global value of drug trafficking alone 1 . In any case, 
Southeast Asia also experiences many other major smuggling and trafficking activities, from 
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the international trade in small arms and in nuclear and other radioactive materials, to the 
international trade in illegally logged timber, forest products and wildlife. It is at once worth 
noting that some of these traffics can be distinguished from many others insofar as they 
constitute instances of environmental harm and predatory activities or both. 
However, while seizures conducted throughout the region attest to the existence of various 
and numerous smuggling and trafficking activities, the scope, diversity, nature and 
mechanisms of the overall phenomenon are far from being satisfactorily studied and 
understood. In fact, the very complexity of the phenomenon goes beyond its diversity and 
fast-evolving trends as the extent of the illegal trades undoubtedly exceeds what is known and 
understood from open or even restricted sources. This condition owes largely to the relative 
failure of concerned authorities and bodies, both at the national and international level, to 
monitor illegal movements across national borders. Yet it is also the result of a general deficit 
in academic research on these issues and of the segmentation of most of the research that has 
been undertaken. The various studies of illegal trades do not provide a regional and systemic 
understanding of the variety of smuggling and trafficking activities. Even less is known of the 
synergies that are likely to exist between drug trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, 
arms trafficking, wood smuggling, etc. As Itty Abraham and Willem van Schendel explain, 
there is a ―problem of compartmentalization, as specialists in small arms and drugs rarely 
communicate, and scholars of smuggling, trafficking, and money laundering have no 
common forum to share their insights, all preventing a comprehensive landscape  of the scale 
of illegal activities from being visualized‖2. 
Still, smuggling and trafficking activities have been drawing increased attention during the 
past decade or so, as globalization further opened and deregulated national and regional 
markets. Trafficking is increasingly being presented as a growing threat in the media as well 
as in governmental and non-governmental reports. This is not only because, as Itty Abraham 
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and Willem van Schendel put it, ―individuals and social groups that systematically contest or 
bypass state controls [...] flout the letter of the law‖ and sometimes jeopardize public health 
(illegal drugs, counterfeit pharmaceuticals), the environment (illegal logging and poaching), 
social fabrics (human smuggling and trafficking), or even peace (arms trafficking). In fact, 
states see trafficking activities as a major threat also because smugglers and traffickers ―bring 
into question the legitimacy of the state itself by questioning the state‘s ability to control its 
own territory‖ 3 . Whether smuggling and trafficking activities are clearly on the rise or 
whether greater attention has been paid by national and international authorities, the 
phenomenon nowadays is more and more presented as a major multi-fold and worldwide 
threat.  
But, while globalization has undoubtedly and increasingly transformed the phenomenon 
during recent decades, the historical and geographical approach of notions such as borders, 
frontiers and routes, shows us that the phenomenon is far from being entirely new. History 
shows that the rise of the nation-state and its multiple regulations have directly affected 
various types and ways of trading by rendering them illegal. Thus, to shed some light on what 
is, by essence, a complex and shadowy world made of illegal and therefore absconded 
activities one must first understand how ―the politics of access and of its denial‖4 have been 
deeply affected by the modern modification of frontiers, borders, routes and regulations. But, 
firstly, the widely used notions of smuggling and trafficking need to be distinguished from 
each other and explained, in order to show that although both activities amount to illegal 
trading, smuggling is not trafficking.  
Smuggling or trafficking? 
One major distinction must be made between the different activities that amount to illegal 
trading. Illegal trades can be distinguished according to the nature of the goods that are 
exchanged as well as to the nature of the trade itself. Therefore, distinguishing between 
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smuggling and trafficking enables us to dissociate two major types of illegal trading and to 
overcome the confusion of two terms that are frequently used interchangeably and without 
distinction. To that effect, one can build on the work of David Bevan, Paul Collier and Jan 
Gunning5, who separate what they call ―black goods‖ (goods that are illegal) and ―black 
parallel markets‖ (where legal goods are being traded illegally). Another interesting and 
useful distinction has been made by Abraham and Van Schendel who ―build up a distinction 
between what states consider to be legitimate (―legal‖) and what people involved in 
transnational networks consider to be legitimate (licit)‖. As the authors explain, this 
distinction is most useful in the context of an ―approach to issues of legality and illegality 
which does not take the state as its point of departure‖6. Yet, raising issues of legitimacy in 
this book would have made things even more complicated than they already were (rights of 
individuals to consume drugs, own guns, poach, log, mine, illegally and willingly across 
international border, etc.) and it was thought here that focusing on what made some cross 
border activities illegal according to national laws was a better choice, which does not mean 
that the perceptions of borders and borderlanders have been dismissed altogether. 
Hereafter, smuggling will describe the importation and, or, exportation of legal goods 
contrary to the law of at least one country, especially when duties are not paid or when part of 
a regulation is not observed. As for trafficking, it will describe a trade in goods that are illegal 
per se; that is, a trade therefore illegal by definition. Thus trading in heroin differs greatly 
from trading in cigarettes since heroin is an illegal product and cigarettes are produced and 
sold legally. Nevertheless, cigarette smuggling is rampant in the world, for instance in the 
European Union, owing to great variation in duties and ages of legal consumption from 
country to country. Therefore, duties, regulations and prohibition partly determine the extent 
to which goods are smuggled or trafficked, whether locally, regionally or globally7 . Of 
course, goods that are considered ―licit‖ by people involved in transnational networks are 
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more likely to be smuggled and, or, trafficked, than goods deemed ―illicit‖, whether they are 
legal or not. 
Usually, the difference between smuggling and trafficking is made only concerning the 
trade in human beings. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), human smuggling and human trafficking are similar in some respects, but bear 
several important differences. The United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, defines the ―smuggling of migrants‖ as ―the procurement, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry 
of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident.‖ 
The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines 
―trafficking in persons‖ as ―the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour 
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.‖ Thus, 
trafficked victims, according to the UNODC, ―have either never consented or, if they initially 
consented, that consent has been rendered meaningless by the coercive, deceptive or abusive 
actions of the traffickers.‖ Another major difference, according to the UNODC, is that 
―smuggling ends with the arrival of the migrants at their destination, whereas trafficking 
involves the ongoing exploitation of the victims in some manner to generate illicit profits for 
the traffickers.‖ 
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Thus, according to the United Nations, what distinguishes human smuggling from human 
trafficking, which are both illegal practices and designate illegal movements of persons, is 
coercion (or, alternatively, absence of consent). While both smuggled and trafficked people 
are illegal immigrants, only the first are compliant and complicit, unless, of course, initial 
consent is nullified by deception and, or, coercion 8 . The extreme complexity of human 
smuggling and trafficking is notably determined by the fact that activities fed by illegal 
migration—as diverse as prostitution, mining, or even begging—can be either coerced or 
consented activities: prostitution can be voluntary, while forced labour can be used in mines. 
Children, who are increasingly being trafficked, can be abducted to become beggars in a 
foreign country. Moreover, as is the case in Southeast Asia, countries are frequently source, 
transit and destination areas for trafficked persons, depending on the segmentation of national 
and regional markets9. 
Other migrants (emigrants or immigrants) can also be said to be illegal or to have been 
illegally moved from one place to another, for example refugees (as immigrants) and adopted 
children (both as emigrants and immigrants). Refugees often cross international borders 
without proper paperwork but while this kind of illegal immigration is forced, it surely must 
not be viewed as being criminal, for a refugee, while not always benefiting from having 
refugee status, is frequently exposed to physical violence and economic exploitation. This is a 
global phenomenon, despite the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
using the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention as its major tool to ensure the basic human rights 
of vulnerable persons, particularly toward guaranteeing that refugees will not be returned 
involuntarily to a country where they face persecution. 
It is worth noting that children, being especially vulnerable, are among the first victims of 
human trafficking. For instance, Xin Ren alleges that ―trafficking in children for sale, sexual 
exploitation, child pornography, and slavery labour has become one of the fastest growing 
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global crime enterprises stretching from the African continent to Europe and from Asia-
Pacific to North and South America‖. Children are being ―sold, abducted, kidnapped, or lured 
away from their families, bought, exploited, abused or even murdered for profits and illicit 
services‖10 . Of course, trafficking in children can occur in various contexts, with many 
different push and pull factors. For example, illegal adoption is an international phenomenon 
in which local and global push and pull factors can be closely intertwined. Whether for 
domestic or international markets, ―trafficking in children in China is largely for domestic 
illegal adoption that is driven by a deeply rooted traditional belief that only male heirs can 
carry on the family name and sonless marriage is a moral shame that disgraces one‘s 
ancestors‖11. But since legal adoption may prove extremely difficult in Western countries, 
because of strict laws aimed at child protection, and because regulation acts as a strong 
incentive for traffickers, worldwide illegal child adoption has become a highly lucrative 
market.  
Children, as well as men and women, furthermore can be abducted, trafficked and killed 
for forced organ removal for transplant purposes, as high prices paid for kidneys, as just one 
example, drive an extremely profitable global market. However, because sex workers are in 
such great demand worldwide, it appears that 50% of trafficked persons in the world are 
children, and that 70% are women12. As stated by Vitit Muntarbhorn, the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ―the world 
community is faced with a rampant and perverse sex market which wreaks havoc on a 
multitude of children‖13. Indeed, ECPAT14, an international non-governmental organization 
working to ―End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking in Children for 
sexual purposes‖, reports that there are more than 1 million child prostitutes involved in sex 
tourism in Asia, of which 300,000 are in Thailand, 100,000 in the Philippines and Taiwan 
and 40,000 in Vietnam15.  
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In May 2005, in a report that has been termed ―the most comprehensive analysis ever 
undertaken by an intergovernmental organization of the facts and underlying causes of 
contemporary forced labour‖, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) revealed that ―at 
least 12.3 million people were trapped in forced labour around the world‖ and that ―children 
aged less than 18 years bear a heavy burden, comprising 40 to 50 per cent of all forced labour 
victims‖. If we refer to the aforementioned definition provided by the United Nations 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, exploitation through forced 
labour is a fundamental dimension of human trafficking. This is something that the ILO 
report also points to when confirming something that had often been hinted at by less 
comprehensive studies: that forced labour, human trafficking and the sex industry, were 
closely linked. In fact, according to ILO, at least one-fifth of the world‘s 12 million bonded 
labourers are victims of illegal human trafficking—mainly for the sex industry. For instance, 
the report details, ―Forced economic exploitation in such sectors as agriculture, construction, 
brick-making and informal sweatshop manufacturing is more or less evenly divided between 
the sexes‖. However, ―forced commercial sexual exploitation entraps almost entirely women 
and girls‖16. 
Smuggling and trafficking, then, are different, no matter what trade (human beings or 
commercial goods) is concerned. As we will see, the very dimensions and impact of 
smuggling and trafficking also differ, mainly depending on the consequences of the illegal 
trade on source, transit and destination countries. However, to better understand smuggling 
and trafficking activities, one first needs to learn about borders, routes, and their respective 
logics. Indeed, smuggling and trafficking consist of illegal border crossings made via various 
routes or lines of travel, namely trails, paths, roads, and the like. 
Of routes, frontiers and borders: the politics of access 
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A border, through its definition and its delimitation processes, modifies the very nature of 
any traditional trading that preceded its imposition. In fact, for many merchants, activities 
suddenly termed smuggling or trafficking are nothing else than traditional trading turned 
illegal or traditional goods turned illegal; for instance ―what is now called smuggling was 
normal among the Pashtun nomads of eastern Afghanistan for many generations‖17. Indeed, 
according to a Pakistani Afridi from the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan: 
―You might call what we do smuggling. But to us, it‘s just trade‖18. Between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, as well as between Burma and Thailand, imposed boundaries cut through frontier 
zones and tribal land, changing frontiers into borders and creating de facto jurisdictions—in 
effect, bounded legal territories. But boundaries also affect the very nature or existence of 
routes. For example, ―a road through tribal territory is much more than an avenue of mobility. 
Here the laws of the state intersect with the laws of the tribe‖19. As David Ludden explains, 
―Modernity consigned human mobility to the dusty corners of archives that document the 
hegemonic space of national territorialism. As a result, we imagine that mobility is border 
crossing, as though borders came first and mobility second‖20. 
As stressed in the work of Mahnaz Ispahani, a route is ―both a geographical and a political 
idea, both an end and a means‖. Her study of ―the politics of access in the borderlands of 
Asia‖ draws on the work of the French geographer Jean Gottmann who stated that ―one of the 
major aims of politics is to regulate the conditions of access‖. Opposing the route is what 
Mahnaz Ispahani calls the antiroute: ―any natural or artifical constraint on access‖, ranging 
from mountains and deserts to ―legal boundaries and tariffs that raise the cost of crossing 
them‖. Antiroutes, as she rightly observes, ―may serve the same human purposes as routes‖, 
that is, to regulate the conditions of access. Indeed, ―what routes move, and what antiroutes 
prevent from moving, are people and goods within and across frontiers‖21. And routes are 
consubstantial to borders since ―without land routes, borders cannot be defined and secured‖. 
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Ispahani continues, ―Whereas states cannot come into existence without the ability to deny 
access, they cannot be physically consolidated and politically sustained without the ability to 
expand access―without the extension of the authority and the legitimacy of the center to the 
peripheries‖22.  
As Lord Curzon, Governor General and Viceroy of India (1899-1905), remarked, ―the 
earliest frontiers ‗erected a barrier or created a gap‘, that is, restricted movement and 
access‖23. What was true in the borderlands of Southwest Asia, and for its borderlanders, can 
also be osberved in the frontier area that stretched between Burma and Siam in the 19th 
century. When the British raised the question of the western frontier of Siam, in the early 19th 
century, no document or treaty identifying and delimitating the boundary could be provided 
by the local chiefs, as Thongchai Winichakul explains: ―as these were friendly neighbors who 
shared understanding and trust, one local chief replied, the boundary did not forbid people to 
trespass or to earn their living in the area‖24. The borders were even said to be ―golden, silver 
paths, free for traders‖ and ―the tribal people wandering in the mountain forests were subjects 
of no power‖25. Borders were then far from being boundaries: they were frontiers. Lord 
Curzon depicted this ―widely diffused type of ancient Frontier‖ that was that of ―the 
intermediary or Neutral Zone‖: ―This may be described as a Frontier of separation in place of 
contact, a line whose distinguishing feature is that it possesses breadth as well as length‖26. 
Boundaries were surimposed on transfrontier routes then, since Southeast Asian frontiers 
have long been areas linking policies rather than separating them27. Colonialism and, later, 
nationalism, required having boundary lines clearly demarcated: ―The major principle behind 
the Asian frontier system was recognition of the desirability of avoiding direct contact 
between the administered territories of the various colonial empires concerned‖28 (see map 
5). In Asia, where the power over individuals was traditionally separated from the power over 
land, since a subject was bound first and foremost to his lord rather than to a state, modern 
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boundaries have ―violently and arbitrarily‖ divided ―ethnic peoples into different nationals‖29. 
Hence, the ‗external‘, or alien, may not really be external ―while the ‗internal‘ can be made 
alien or external‖ as various tribal or refugee people can still experience in Thailand, where 
many tribal people have spent decades waiting for Thai citizenship and thus have never 
―belonged‖ to any state or nation30. 
As far as the symbiotic relationship between routes and borders is concerned, Abraham 
and Van Schendel explain how ―the act of enforcing a selected flow of people and objects 
across a border, from border patrols to customs, immediately allows for the possibility of 
rents to be charged for circumventing these rules and by the same token provides 
opportunities for smuggling of people and objects across these borders‖. Of course, ―The 
weight of enforcement is directly related to the prices that can be charged for getting around 
it—the risk, uncertainty and demand for these flows ―across the border‖ all go into making 
the border a site for illicitness, from an economic point of view‖. But, it is also important to 
understand that ―making borders also makes illicit the life activities of border 
communities‖31. Andrew Walker also stresses the fact that ― ‗open‘ borders, characterised by 
flow and passage, usually provide more opportunities for regulation than ‗closed‘ borders‖32. 
Not surprisingly, all kinds of smuggling and trafficking flourish in these old frontier areas 
that often became buffer zones, as had been and still is the case between Burma and 
Thailand: if the border not only affords some protection to the refugees (from political 
oppression, economic distress, or even law enforcement) who cross it, it can also help enrich 
those who do not travel ―empty-handed‖. Thus, a route and an antiroute can engender one 
another: a closed border can engender a route to transgress it and the rules and restrictions it 
implies; the presence of a route can call for an artificial antiroute (a checkpoint for example) 
to monitor or restrict access. Hence the ever-growing diversity of smuggling and trafficking 
routes and techniques that arise as a consequence of growing markets and increased controls. 
13 
From ancient to modern routes 
That both legal and illegal goods can be traded on the same routes or even together in the 
same cargo is made easier by the marked increase in movements of goods by land, sea and 
even air, especially during recent decades. Hiding illegal goods among legal cargo is 
becoming easier as the global economy unites national and regional markets and as traded 
goods become more numerous. But modernity draws heavily on history and so-called new 
routes are often only old routes that have been rediscovered or revived33.  
In mainland Southeast Asia, as Mya Maung stresses, history teaches us that most of the 
trading routes between Burma and Thailand are old historic roads, some of them being ―the 
ancient trails used by the Burmese kings when they invaded Thailand‖ 34 . Mya Maung 
describes precisely the routes and trading points that allowed black markets to flourish along 
the Sino-Thai-Indo-Burmese borders: he accounts for ―ten different major black market 
routes between Burma and its three neighbours of China, Thailand, and India‖35.  
The most active illegal border trade between Burma and Thailand occurred and still occurs 
at three points: Mae Sai, Mae Sot and Ranong. Goods traded illegally across the Thai-
Burmese border were and are still extremely diverse: according to Mya Maung, it was 
reported that, in the 1970s, Thailand‘s major exports through the border outposts were 
―pharmaceutical products, aluminium, wadding rope-coated fabric, boiler machinery, 
synthetic rubber, and man-made fibre,‖ while in the 1980s, the dominant exports of Thailand 
were ―edible preparations, organic chemicals, iron and steel, manufacturing articles and 
wadding rope.‖ The dominant imports of Thailand from Burma have been wood and wood 
articles, especially teak, and gems‖36.  
As for the trade between China and Burma, it developed considerably in the 1990s along 
the famed Burma Road, across Burma‘s Shan State toward China‘s Yunnan Province. Once 
again, of course, this road and the majority of the Shan trading posts ―were not really new, 
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their existence dating back to the days of the Burmese kings‖. In the thirteenth century, 
―Chinese trading caravans and the invading army of Kublai Khan from China travelled that 
route‖ 37 . As with Thailand, goods illegally traded between Burma and China are 
manufactured in one direction and natural products in the other. Another major trading route 
between Burma and China lies in Kachin State and was, until the Kachin Independence Army 
lost control over the jade mines, ―the main route for smuggling famous Burmese jade and 
gems‖38. 
These old trading routes of mainland Southeast Asia, some of them also linking China to 
India, have been plied by merchants even when international boundaries were officially 
closed. Because clandestine border crossings are illegal, the increased risk of such actions 
raises the value of both the people and goods that accomplish it: having to deal with closed 
borders, and as some rarefied goods became more expensive and interesting to trade, 
merchants turned into smugglers and, or, traffickers. Indeed, as many have acknowledged, 
―making borders engenders illicitness, or in Janet Roitman‘s words, transgression is 
productive‖39.  
The evolution of drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle has forged new transport routes 
in the region and has brought abandoned routes back into service, such as those previously 
used by communist guerrillas. Other pathways were never abandoned. Traditional caravaners 
such as the Haw of Thailand and the Hui (Panthay) of Burma are very active in the regional 
illicit drug trade, and still use routes today that their forebears used at the end of the 19th 
century40 (see map 7).  
It should be noted here that smuggling and trafficking are old activities that are 
consubstantial to trading and date back to the earliest regulatory practices meant to restrict 
and tax commerce. Smuggling actually developed considerably in the context of the British 
and French colonial tariff regimes. In his extremely valuable study of regulation, trade and 
15 
traders in the borderlands of Laos, Thailand and Burma, Andrew Walker quotes Sidney 
Legendre, a visitor to Luang Phrabang in the early twentieth century (1936): ―The French had 
placed such a high duty on all goods entering Indo-China that smuggling has become one of 
the most essential and profitable if not the most honourable of the native trades‖. 
Counterfeiting also dates back a long time for Legendre explains that Chinese smugglers 
―have commenced the importation from China of cheap copies of English, French and 
American goods‖ and that he himself bought a Waterman fountain pen and a pair of ―Keds‖ 
tennis shoes that he found to be ―the rankest imitations‖41. Opium smuggling also preceded 
opium trafficking: in the context of the British and French colonial monopolies (see map 5), 
but also of the Siamese monopoly, independent trading was prohibited and opium smuggling 
became a very profitable enterprise, especially for Yunnanese and Shan caravaners. The 
British (who sold only Indian opium in their colonial possessions) and the Siamese faced 
smuggling of Chinese opium into Burma and Siam, while the French faced the same problem 
in Laos, where they were processing and selling Shan opium from Burma (Kengtung)42. 
Diversity and complexity of smuggling and trafficking activities 
As we have seen, smuggling and trafficking differ according to the (il)legality of the 
traded goods. Since the trading activity is basically the same―sending goods illegally across 
a border―networks and techniques can alternatively or concurrently be used. A great 
diversity of goods can be legally traded, smuggled and trafficked along one specific route, 
either separately or concurrently. Trafficking of various illegal goods almost invariably 
occurs along a single route, in the same cargo or not. This, of course, is not a new 
phenomenon; for example, drugs-for-arms deals have long been in existence across the 
world. Obviously, successful smuggling and trafficking routes are very much prone to 
multiple traffics: in mainland Southeast Asia, as this books shows, most smuggling and 
trafficking activities appear to occur on the same routes. Overall, the same routes are used for 
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the trafficking in small arms, the trade in illegally logged timber, forest products and wildlife, 
for people smuggling, drug trafficking, the trade in counterfeit goods and for contraband. The 
coexistence, both in time and space, of various smuggling and trafficking activities, 
concurrent or congruent, is frequent as illegal trading, as an activity, is not always segmented 
according to the goods that are illegally traded.  
But while a certain degree of coexistence of trafficking activities exists, some of the 
activities, such as trafficking in nuclear or radiological materials, are at most only suspected. 
On the contrary, activities such as drug trafficking are much better known. Indeed, ―although 
there is little evidence of involvement of organized criminal groups in nuclear trafficking 
worldwide, the success with which criminals have smuggled other contraband in South and 
Southeast Asia―such as narcotic drugs and conventional arms―suggests that nuclear 
trafficking might be carried out with relative ease, along some of the same routes, by the 
same criminals, with little hindrance by authorities or permeable border controls‖43. In fact, 
according to Lyudmila Zaitseva and Kevin Hand, ―because of the ease with which organized 
crime can avoid detection of their illicit activities... [n]etworks trafficking in drugs, weapons, 
and other illicit commodities are well suited for nuclear smuggling. Their experience in 
avoiding detection, knowledge of safe routes, protection by corrupt authorities, and 
established infrastructures can be utilized for trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive 
material‖44.  
Another well known fact is that arms can be exchanged for illegal drugs by using the same 
networks and corridors (especially when rebel armies are involved in production, and, or 
trafficking of drugs), as has been the case in Afghanistan, in Burma and in northeast India. 
Human beings, for instance Chinese women, are also smuggled and trafficked into Southeast 
Asia on the same routes used for drug trafficking to feed, for example, a well-established 
regional prostitution market (chiefly, Chinese women go south while Burmese heroin goes 
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north). Logically, if drugs can be more or less safely trafficked across certain borders and 
territories, then other items can also follow the same trails, either hidden into large legal 
cargo and transited across legal entry points, or more or less discretely smuggled and 
trafficked over long and porous borders, through mountain passes, across rivers or even by 
unauthorized or unchecked helicopter flights (antiques from Burma being one example). In 
mainland Southeast Asia smuggling and trafficking is not only made easier by its often 
mountainous and heavily forested relief but also by its large number of extremely diverse 
ethnic groups, many of them tribal and semi-nomadic, who straddle international borders (see 
maps 2, 3, 6). 
The number and diversity of drug trafficking routes enable other types of smuggling and, 
or, trafficking activities, sometimes by notorious drug traffickers themselves. For example, 
trafficking in counterfeit goods has recently increased across the Thailand-Burma border. 
Based near Thailand‘s northern border with Burma, some key drug traffickers such as Wei 
Hsueh Kang have diversified their activities into producing and trafficking pirated 
pornographic Video Compact Discs (VCDs). This proves interesting since it brings another 
category of traffickers to the fore: those taking advantage of legal touristic migrations 
between Tachileck, in Burma, to Mae Sai, in Thailand. The result is an upsurge of trafficking 
in pirated VCDs. Considering that pirated copies of Hollywood, Thai, Chinese and 
Taiwanese films can be found everywhere in Tachileck and that ―about 1000 tourists cross 
the border from Thailand to Tachileck every day, rising to 6000 a day during a holiday‖, Thai 
authorities estimate that about 80% of these tourists buy pirated VCDs in Burma and bring 
them back in Thailand45. Also widely available at Tachileck markets are Chinese-made sex 
stimulants that are not approved by Thailand‘s Food and Drug Administration and end up 
being seized by customs officials from returning tourists. As far as counterfeited goods are 
concerned, a new trend is emerging in Southeast Asia, where drug-resistant malaria is 
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widespread and is ―fuelling a roaring trade in counterfeit drugs, including the new and 
effective Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy (ACT) drugs‖: ―Even the Artemisinin 
compounds―touted as the solution to drug resistance―are being faked in Southeast Asia. 
The counterfeiters follow where people are buying these drugs, counterfeit the drug and put it 
in the market‖46. This is a clear and recent example of how drug-trafficking routes can be 
used for other trafficking activities. In this case, a famous drug trafficker diversifies its 
production and trafficking activities thanks to the networks and routes he controls. But such 
routes are being widely used by other smugglers and traffickers, either for the same trades or 
for different ones. 
The scope of illegal trades in Mainland Southeast Asia 
Various examples of smuggling and trafficking activities show that these drug trafficking 
routes are conducive to multiple trafficking. Mainland Southeast Asia has experienced 
decades of wars and conflicts, from the Indochina wars, including the Vietnam War, to the 
internal conflicts in Burma and Cambodia. The armed violence and numerous human rights 
violations of the Rangoon junta and its army in Shan State, for example, have increased an 
already constant inflow of Burmese refugees into Thailand. During the past four decades 
Thailand has become a major country of asylum, receiving some 1.3 million refugees47. 
Yet, armed conflicts have not only thrown waves of refugees on the roads and across 
international borders, they have also spurred an international and regional trade in small arms 
that is still very active and regionally integrated. In the 1990s Cambodia had emerged as a 
regional market for small arms: ―Myanmar rebel groups, secessionists from Sri Lanka and 
supporters of Acehnese independence movements in Indonesia were among those groups that 
have were buying weapons from Cambodia‘s well-established black market‖48.  
Arms shipments from Cambodia could reach all the way to India, as was allegedly the 
case in the late 1990s when arms consignments comprising ―AK series rifles, mortars, 
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landmines, Sten guns and high-powered explosives‖, meant for various insurgent groups in 
northeastern India, were said to be coming from Bangladesh, where illegal drugs from Burma 
and arms from Cambodia crossed their paths: ―The drug shipments head towards Jaffna and 
from there to various destinations in West Asia for entry into the European and US markets. 
According to intelligence sources, Ranong Island off the coast of Thailand is the staging 
point for arms shipments that originate from Cambodia and take the sea route through the 
Andaman Sea to the major receiving point at Cox‘s Bazar, Bangladesh‘s southernmost tip‖. 
While this route has been used by arms dealers and their end-users for a number of years, the 
alleged ―drug trafficking by the LTTE has added a new dimension‖49. This maritime route 
has also clearly been used for trafficking drugs as the January 2001 seizure of heroin and 
methamphetamine off Surin Island (Thailand) has shown: via the Irrawaddy River Burmese 
heroin reached the Andaman Sea where fishing boats took it to Ko Surin and unloaded it 
south of Ranong (see maps 12, 15). Ranong is thus not only one of the main trading points for 
the Burmese black market; it is also a drug-trafficking node and a well-known passage for 
human smuggling, as testified by its rampant prostitution.  
But India‘s eastern borders with Bangladesh and Burma have also ―witnessed smuggling 
incidents―some of which involved nuclear material of indigenous South and Southeast 
Asian origin―which since the late 1990s have led authorities to suspect the operation of 
organized nuclear smuggling rings in the India-Bangladesh border area‖50. Indeed, ―cesium-
137, a radioactive material that could fuel a potent Radiological Dispersal Device, was 
smuggled into Bangkok, Thailand, in 2003. The material was reported to have entered 
Thailand across the Laotian border and was said to have been of Russian origin. In 2001, 
equipment stolen from a public works facility in Bangkok contained radioactive material, 
including cesium-137. In addition, [...] in 1993, police in Hanoi, Vietnam, arrested a 
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Vietnamese man for smuggling 10 kg of uranium from his former workplace in the former 
Soviet Union‖51. 
Southeast Asian borders are also known for other thriving smuggling and trafficking 
activities. Burmese teak (Tectona grandis), for example, has long been increasingly logged 
and exported to Thailand, some of it smuggled, since in 1989 Thailand forbade its own teak 
from being cut. Farther north, on the Chinese-Burmese border, it is the Wa hills that are being 
deforested, this for the economic benefit of China and in the context of a hastened opium 
suppression programme52. Much has been said on Burma‘s balance of payments and the fact 
that it shows hundreds of millions of dollars in unexplained foreign financial inflows. The 
most widely accepted explanation was that heroin exports were the largest contributor to the 
country‘s economy. However, illegal timber exports are likely to have contributed tens of 
millions of dollars to these financial inflows. ―As well as deliberately concealed exports, 
another explanation for the export-import discrepancies … is that substantial timber exports 
are taking place from territories outside the control of the Forest Department. Both 
explanations are probably valid. Burma‘s biggest customers (China, India, and Thailand) are 
not only its neighbours, thus facilitating unofficial cross-border trade, but also report the 
greatest differences between their imports and Burma‘s declared exports. Thailand reported 
more than four times Burma‘s declared exports in 1994 and double the declared exports in 
1995; India did not provide any statistics for 1994, but in 1995 its declared imports were 30 
times greater than Burma‘s declared exports. Burma reported no exports to China in 1995, 
though China declared imports of more than 500,000 m3‖53.  
According to the Chiang Mai based Lahu National Development Organisation, ―There is 
hardly any teak forest remaining [in Eastern Shan state, Burma], but other kinds of hardwood, 
pinewood and fragrant sandalwood are still in great demand‖. The LNDO also reports that 
―[m]ost of the ceasefire groups and militia are involved in logging in their areas, some in 
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conjunction with wealthy businessmen from the cities‖ and that ―[t]he UWSA‘s Hong Pang 
company is currently the main organisation in eastern Shan State carrying out logging. They 
have their own logging equipment, and also sub-contract other local or foreign (Thai or 
Chinese) loggers with equipment to carry out the logging‖ 54 . More of Burma‘s natural 
resources are being plundered in the country‘s peripheries as numerous non-timber forest 
products are also being removed from Burma‘s luxurious forests. The LNDO also mentions 
that: ―There is a huge demand from China for wildlife and forest products, mainly for 
medicinal purposes. These include tortoises, bears‘ gall bladders, snakes, otter skins, pangolin 
scales and wild orchids. Despite the fact that many of these species are endangered and trade 
in them is prohibited in Burma, there exists a thriving black market network to locate and 
export the various items. The main dealers are Chinese businesspeople living in towns such 
as Tachilek and Kengtung. They send out representatives to villages, where they place orders 
for certain products with local agents. Villagers are told that if they can find the products, 
they will receive a particular amount of money, for example up to 20,000 kyat (approx 
US$20) per 10 tical (approx 160 g) of bear‘s gall bladder or 150 000 kyat (approx US$140) 
per viss (1,6 kg) for first class orchids‖ 55 . The wildlife of mainland Southeast Asia has 
already considerably suffered from the wide-scale hunting, poaching, and trafficking of 
numerous species, reorienting the plunder and trade toward countries that have been 
somehow spared until recently. Hence, ―as neighbouring countries have exhausted their own 
valuable natural resources, the price for Cambodia‘s last populations of tigers, elephants, and 
bears has soared to levels undreamed of even a decade ago‖. But Cambodia is not the only 
country concerned: ―as demand for wild animals has grown in far off places, new supply 
routes have opened up in Asia‖, most notably in Burma, and ―the supply routes are growing 
bigger and more sophisticated by the day‖56. As suggested by the above-mentioned examples, 
smuggling and trafficking activities are widespread and extremely diverse in Southeast Asia.  
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Trafficking synergies or isolated trends?  
There is a distinction that goes beyond that made between smuggling and trafficking. 
Indeed, smuggling and trafficking vie not only on newly generated resources such as illegal 
drugs but also and even more on non-renewable natural resources: most of smuggling and 
trafficking activities thrive on what can be designated as predatory economies and activities, 
that is, most notably, plundering of natural resources. What is rarely acknowledged is that 
such trading can prove much more detrimental to the environment and to human societies 
than the production of, and trafficking in, illegal drugs (the environmental costs of which 
should not be ignored either) or counterfeit items (even though counterfeit mechanical parts 
and medical drugs present obvious dangers). But since smuggling and trafficking are of 
concern for source, transit, and destinations countries, one has to dissociate the impacts and 
consequences of these trades according to their very nature and extent. For instance, human 
trafficking can have extremely detrimental social and health consequences in source as well 
as in destination countries. As for the trade in exotic timber and rare animal species, it can 
create environmental havoc in source countries (forest depletion but also landslides, 
vulnerability to tidal waves, etc.) but is unlikely to have dramatic consequences in destination 
countries, at least until a probable global impact is felt in these countries.  
Moreover, some law enforcement activities can have rather perverse and so-called 
unintended consequences, fuelling other illegal activities than the targeted one as producers 
and, or, smugglers and traffickers resort to alternative economic activities to make up for lost 
revenues. For example, the ―war on drugs‖ can clearly be counter-productive in terms of drug 
production, ―resulting in perverse incentives for farmers to grow more drugs (e.g., in 
Colombia), displacement of production to more remote areas, and fuelling of violence and 
insecurity (Peru, Bolivia, Colombia), which in several cases forced the eradication policy to 
be reversed and led to adverse political outcomes‖57. No doubt, such a phenomenon occurs in 
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Asia too, where the failure to provide economic alternatives to opium production before 
eradicating poppy crops also can have a devastating impact on the impoverished rural people 
who depend on the illegal opium economy for their livelihood58, and thus foster other drug-
trafficking activities (heroin in lieu of opium, methamphetamine in lieu of opium and, or 
heroin) such as human trafficking, widespread logging, trafficking in rare species, etc. 
Other such synergies can be suspected and still need to be properly documented and 
understood. For example, various trades and movements can be linked: the sex trade can, to 
some extent, be nurtured by ill-designed and ill-implemented anti-drug policies, thus 
worsening an AIDS pandemic that, in Asia, grows mostly through intravenous drug use. The 
AIDS pandemic can also be suspected of spurring child prostitution as it is likely that the 
worldwide explosion of child prostitution that happened after 1985 has been partly driven by 
the fear of AIDS (but also by a growing worldwide tourism industry that made sex tourism 
more affordable). Moreover, when eradication of illegal crops such as opium is favoured 
against the development of alternative livelihoods, ―unintended‖ consequences such as 
accelerated deforestation and other predatory activities are very much likely to occur. 
As for small arms smuggling and trafficking, mostly of ordinary conventional weapons, it 
is responsible for the vast majority of casualties in the world‘s conflicts and thus for the 
death, wounding and uprooting of a countless number of people each year59. In Southeast 
Asia, as is now well known, decades of armed conflicts (in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
Burma) have spurred the production and traffic of opium, heroin and, more recently, 
methamphetamine. But armed conflicts have also put hundreds of thousands of refugees on 
the move and across the national borders of the region, creating favourable conditions for the 
growth of black markets, the regional sex trade, and drug trafficking and consumption.  
Of course, demand from buyers around the world plays a significant role by fuelling these 
trades. But poverty and underdevelopment as well as economic disruptions, political crises, 
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armed conflicts and natural catastrophes create local, national and regional contexts and 
synergies that can push people into smuggling and trafficking. In Southeast Asia as in the rest 
of the world the smuggling and trafficking phenomenon is extremely diverse and complex. 
Complex yet unaccounted, for synergies are undoubtedly at work between different 
smuggling and trafficking activities. The case of mainland Southeast Asia shows a complex 
reality in which every smuggler or trafficker may not be a versatile and diversified merchant, 
but where many illegal trades coexist and can compete with and, or, benefit from each other, 
though to an extent that will not be satisfactorily known and understood until further research 
is conducted through specific case studies. 
Five authors, six case studies 
This volume addresses the diversity and complexity of illegal trading in mainland 
Southeast Asia, not by presenting an exhaustive state of illegal trades but by surveying the 
scope and multi-fold nature of the phenomenon. As an atlas, it focuses on the routes used to 
carry various illegal trades in the region. The attempt here has been to gather contributors 
who could write about illegal trades from a variety of disciplines and could contribute to the 
mapping of the smuggling and trafficking routes according to their respective fields of 
expertise. It seemed logical, if not necessary, to draw maps of the routes described in the 
chapters of this volume, so that the readers could better visualise how illegal trades organised 
themselves spatially, but also to enable a comparison between the different routes followed 
by the different trades. In the end it appears that the different trades tend to follow the same 
routes, with the same main cross border points being used for either drug trafficking, human 
smuggling or trafficking, the illegal trade in wood, wildlife, small arms, and counterfeit 
goods (see map31). In fact the smuggling and trafficking routes correspond to a great extent 
to the main transport corridors of the region (compare maps 8 and 31): basically the historic 
trading roads of mainland Southeast Asia, India, and China (map 7) that were included in 
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both the Asian Highway Network project (1959) and the more recent Greater Mekong 
Subregion corridor project (1992) (map 8). 
Mapping smuggling and trafficking routes is a difficult and delicate task, not only because 
such activities are meant to be concealed, but also because of difficulties and limitations 
inherent to the cartographic process. Mapping is not very different from writing in its way of 
describing and representing reality, yet it is too often read as being not a representation of 
reality but the real itself. The map, writes Marco Quaggiotto, ―is not only a passive 
representation of reality but a tool for the production of meaning‖, just like any text: ―The 
map as narration, is thus the expression of a communicative purpose‖ 60 . But ―a 
representation is reproduced rather than reality‖ stresses Geoff King, who also warns that, too 
often, in the cartographic process, ―the distinction between reality and representation 
becomes blurred‖61. Quaggiotto rightly explains: 
―Just like a text, the map makes selections on reality, distorts events, classifies and 
clarifies the world in order to better tell a particular aspect of a territory, an event, a space. 
When used with malice, it can hide, conceal, falsify or diminish a reality through the 
construction of an ideological discourse, in which the communicative aims are hidden to the 
user. In this context, the term ‗map‘ is a synonym of visual narration of space: a cultural 
artefact created by an author to describe a space according to an objective‖62. 
In fact, cartography, like any discourse, has its own rhetoric, that is, ―a linguistic technique 
used to select and process elements of reality in order to transform them in an effective 
speech‖63. This is actually what Van Schendel aims at when he criticizes what he calls a 
―surfeit of arrows‖. Arrows, bodies and heads, are of course useful tools resorted to by the 
cartographer while mapping smuggling and trafficking routes, something that Van Schendel 
denounces not only because ―the arrow is a godsend for those wishing to represent illegal 
flows in a threatening manner‖ but also because: 
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―The discourse on illegal flows focuses on the (ill) effects of the flows at their points of 
destination but has little time for possible effects at the various staging posts, including 
borders: it is the head of the arrow rather than its body that we are invited to concentrate 
on‖64. 
Arrows were of course used in this atlas, not ―to represent illegal flows in a threatening 
manner‖ but because the arrow is a ―discursive tool that conveys the notion of motion, 
stimulus, and target as perhaps no other graphic code could‖65. Also, borders were drawn in a 
very usual way by using thin lines that can also be said to misrepresent the reality of 
borderlands and frontiers (something that Van Schendel does not criticize). An effort was 
made, however, to represent smuggling and trafficking as cross border activities by detailing 
as many border towns, staging posts, and hubs as possible (Tachileck – Mae Sai and Muse – 
Ruili for example). In any case, cartography is obviously ―an art of compromise and partial 
solutions‖66 and a knowledge map should never be conflated with the reality it intends to 
depict or represent. Van Schendel is right when he writes that ―bold arrows hide more than 
they reveal‖ as many maps of flows are drawn with broad arrows showing only directions 
and not actual routes or roads, something that was avoided in this atlas. This is actually why 
arrows in this atlas are not ―quick stopgaps‖ that hide ―our lack of detailed knowledge, 
dramatizing and simplifying processes that we understand at best in outline‖67. In fact, here, 
the maps are nothing more, or less, than the graphic equivalent to the texts that they illustrate. 
Texts and maps complement one another not only by helping the readers to place the many 
locales in the region but also by showing the limited extent of our knowledge and of our 
understanding of what stay, in the end, complex and constantly changing phenomena.  
To some extent the maps of this atlas look alike: the main smuggling and trafficking routes 
are often the same no matter what is actually being smuggled or trafficked. Yet, smuggling 
and trafficking sometimes occur in opposite directions along the very same routes: for 
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example, drugs and arms often go opposite ways. And wildlife and timber go from Burma to 
China along the same routes used to introduce counterfeit goods from China to Burma. The 
reader also needs to keep in mind that smuggling and trafficking can, and most likely do, also 
occur in the blank spaces on the maps: if anything, blank spaces represent more a lack of hard 
evidence than an absence of smuggling or trafficking routes. As the English poet William 
Cowper (1731-1800) wrote, ―Absence of proof is not proof of absence‖.  
The book is divided in 7 chapters and 30 maps. In chapter 1, I, as a geographer, introduce 
this volume by stressing how mainland Southeast Asia shows a complex reality in which 
every smuggler or trafficker may not be a versatile and diversified merchant, but where many 
illegal trades coexist and can compete with and, or, benefit from each other. In chapter 2, I 
provide a broad history and geography of the drug trafficking routes in and out of the so-
called Golden Triangle, whose opium and heroin production and networks have played a 
significant role in both the regional and world history. I detail the old and new drug 
trafficking routes and conclude that ―drug trafficking is only one aspect of the drug economy 
and while the goals of a drug-free world or a drug-free ASEAN will never be reached, efforts 
can and should be made to minimize the harms caused by illegal drug production, trafficking, 
and consumption‖. Chapter 3, by anthropologist David Feingold, focuses on human 
smuggling and trafficking, a highly complex trade that has many historical and social and 
political causes and implications. Feingold calls for the need to develop an epidemiology of 
trafficking and warns against ―more restrictive border security that will push greater numbers 
of migrants to depend on traffickers and smugglers to move them across borders‖. In chapter 
4, David Capie, a political scientist, examines the illegal trade in small arms, obviously a key 
topic in mainland Southeast Asia with its many passed and ongoing armed conflicts. As 
Capie explains, ―while there has been impressive rhetoric about the need to tackle the illicit 
arms trade in the region, there has been much less in the way of practical action‖. He 
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concludes that ―there is little evidence that weapons trafficking will disappear from the 
regional landscape any time soon‖. Chapters 5 and 6, by political scientist Vanda Felbab-
Brown, examine two other key – and interrelated – topics in mainland Southeast Asia: illegal 
logging and wildlife trafficking. Since illegal logging accounts ―for a very large portion of 
forest destruction in the region‖, Felbab-Brown explains that ―law enforcement can be 
tightened, regulatory regimes improved, demand for certified timber encouraged, and demand 
for timber overall reduced‖ but that it remains to be seen ―whether these measures can be 
developed and adopted on a sufficient scale to preserve the world‘s natural biologically-rich 
forest ecosystems that are collapsing at an unprecedented rate‖. Similarly, she stresses how, 
―sadly, the overall prospects for designing policy interventions in a way that can achieve 
substantial reduction in the illegal trade in wildlife in Southeast Asia are not high‖. In 
Chapter 7, Bertil Lintner, a journalist, surveys the trade in counterfeit goods and in 
contraband, two prominent activities in mainland Southeast Asia. Lintner estimates that 
―there is little that can be done to stop the flow of consumer goods—whether real or 
counterfeit—from China to Southeast and South Asia‖. 
Some of mainland Southeast Asia‘s countries rank among the world‘s most corrupt 
countries, with Burma being perceived as the third most corrupt country in the world, after 
Afghanistan and Somalia (in 2009 and according to Transparency International). As for the 
others, Laos ranked 158, along with Cambodia, while Vietnam ranked 120, and Thailand 84, 
along with India. China fared a bit better as the world‘s 79th most corrupt country. On the 
other end, Singapore ranked as the world‘s third least corrupt country.  
Therefore, Cambodia provides a great case study of how corruption undermines anti-
trafficking efforts: it is not usually perceived as being as corrupt as Burma but still ranks as 
one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Cambodian corruption clearly hinders anti-
trafficking efforts at various levels and stages, including at international borders. This was 
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verified during three field trips undertaken in Cambodia in 2010 and 2011. Nine points of 
entry into Cambodia were visited, on the coast (the deep water sea port of Sihanoukville and 
the Oknha Mong Port near Keo Phos) and the borders of Thailand (Poipet, Cham Yeam, 
Prom), Vietnam (Bavet, Tropieng Phlong, Tropieng Sre), and Laos (Dong Kralor). No matter 
what material or human means were deployed at these points of entry, almost no seizures of 
any kind were made during the last years, according to interviewed officials. For example, 
not one single seizure of illegal goods was made using the container scan of Sihanoukville 
since China offered it to Cambodia in 2005. Seizures of illegal drugs were almost unknown at 
any of the nine aforementioned cross border checkpoints, except for small quantities years 
ago. Seizures seemed virtually nonexistent and the Cambodian customs appeared to be 
mostly concerned with collecting tax and duties while the border police and the immigration 
police did not seem to be more efficient at intercepting traffickers or smugglers. But 
corruption is not the only issue hindering anti-trafficking efforts in Cambodia, or in the other 
countries of the region. In fact, the Border Liaison Offices (BLO) (see map 9) set up by 
UNODC in Cambodia, if functioning at all, did not seem to be very efficient either. The staff 
of the Poipet BLO was actually absent (reportedly in Phnom Penh) when visited in late 2010 
(although the visit had been planned in accordance with UNODC) and interviews conducted 
with senior administrative authorities revealed that bilateral meetings or communications 
rarely happened and never yielded any result. Corruption is obviously a major hindrance to 
counter-trafficking policies in mainland Southeast Asia but ill-designed programs also bear 
responsibility for the overall failure of interdiction efforts, especially when development 
programs aimed at strengthening anti-trafficking measures fail to integrate anti-corruption 
measures, such as in Cambodia. 
In the end it seems that while national governments, ASEAN, UNODC, and NGOs have 
made and keep making efforts against trafficking and smuggling, no significant achievement 
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will be reached without addressing corruption and its causes. In a similar way, addressing 
illicit drug production in the region will only be possible by addressing poverty, i.e. the main 
driver of illegal opium production. Corruption and illegal opium production actually happen 
to have the same root causes: poverty and the desire for a better life, but also violence 
(repression, persecution, war, genocide) and environmental degradation. Suppressing 
smuggling and trafficking altogether in mainland Southeast Asia (or anywhere else for that 
matter) will never be possible for illegal trading is the necessary corollary of commerce. But 
reducing the scope of smuggling and trafficking is something that can be achieved if the 
policies and measures devised to address the problem also aim at the root causes of the 
phenomenon, that is, poverty and corruption. 
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